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Abstract
Two common principles in distributional analysis are that (i) a progressive transfer moves the
Lorenz curve upwards, and (ii) progressive [neutral] taxation reduces [leaves unchanged]
inequality. In order to establish these results it is currently assumed that the distribution of
income is exogenously given. The relevance of these results is therefore limited in practice
where incomes are determined by the working decisions of the agents in the economy.
Considering a simple economy with two goods and two agents we indicate sufficient
conditions for inequality in net income to decrease as a result of rich to poor transfers or
progressive taxation. By means of simple examples we show that, when one incorporates
labour supply responses, the fulfillment of these conditions is highly hypothetical and that
everything can happen.
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The normative theory of income distribution and redistribution assumes to a large extent that 
individual incomes are exogenously given.
2 This first round analysis results in neat and 
elegant theoretical conclusions at the cost of limited applicability since real world incomes 
are determined by a complex system of interactions where agents' behaviour plays a sub-
stantive role. This paper reconsiders two well-established principles in the standard theory of 
income distribution analysis that prove to rely crucially on the assumption that individuals do 
not adjust their behaviour to the modification of the institutional environment. 
 
Following Atkinson (1970) (see also Kolm 1969) it is now a well-established practice to 
measure inequality by means of Lorenz curves: a distribution is less unequal than another 
distribution if its Lorenz curve lies nowhere below that of the other distribution. According to 
the principle of transfers, a redistribution of income from a richer individual to a poorer indi-
vidual – a so-called progressive transfer – is typically considered as reducing inequality as it 
moves upwards the Lorenz curve of the original distribution. It is so the case that most of the 
profession assimilates inequality reduction with a combination of such progressive transfers.
3 
A second important principle is that of redistributive taxation according to which a progres-
sive tax schedule – understood as an increasing average tax rate – implies more equally 
distributed incomes in the sense that the Lorenz curve of post-tax incomes lies above that of 
pre-tax incomes (Jakobsson 1976). 
 
The aim of this note is to examine to which extent the recognition that individuals react to 
progressive transfers and income taxation calls into question the two principles above. We 
present simple examples demonstrating that these two principles do no longer hold when 
labour supply is fully accounted for in the model. Considering non-pathological and suffi-
ciently flexible preferences that lead to linear labour supply, we show that the change in 
inequality due to (i) progressive transfers, and (ii) neutral or progressive taxation is indeter-
mined: inequality can decrease, increase or be unchanged. Although this observation is cer-
tainly not original, we claim that there does not appear to be papers in the literature – to the 
best of our knowledge – demonstrating it in such a simple way. It is our trust that these exam-
ples might provide useful starting points for extending the theory. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the economy we 
consider in the paper. We investigate the impact on effective income inequality of progres-
sive transfers in Section 3. The implication for the distribution of net income of taxation is 
examined in Section 4 considering successively proportional and progressive taxes. Finally 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                 
1  The paper forms part of the research programme of the TMR network Living Standards, Inequality and 
Taxation [Contract No. ERBFMRXCT980248] of the European Communities whose financial support is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
2  For instance Lambert's (1993) survey devotes 250 pages to the case where incomes are exogenously given 
while less than 20 pages consider the case where incomes are endogenous to the model. In the third edition 
(Lambert 2001) the respective chapter has even completely disappeared. 
3  Actually this is not so true as a number of experimental studies by means of questionnaires have demon-
strated that a significant fraction of the respondents do not subscribe to this view (see e.g. Amiel and Cowell 
1999).  
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2.  Framework 
 
At first we describe the underlying model and introduce the notation. There are two com-
modities, consumption C and time L spent on work. We consider two individuals i () 1, 2 i = . 
Both have the same preference ordering on consumption and labour which can be represented 
by an ordinal utility function  () , UCL. We assume that U is increasing in consumption, 
decreasing in labour and twice differentiable. Furthermore the preference ordering is 
supposed to be convex. Individual i  ( ) 1, 2 i =  possesses the wage rate  i w  and an exogenous 
income  i M . The price of consumption (demand) is equal to unity. Each individual maximizes 
her utility function subject to the budget constraint which is given by  ii i i Cw LM =+ . Then 
() , ii LwM  denotes the labour supply function. In what follows we always assume that 
12 ww <  and that individual 1’s (gross or net) income is strictly lower than individual 2’s one. 
 
For a society consisting of two individuals the measurement of inequality is very simple and 
unambiguous. Given an income distribution  ( ) 12 , X X = X , the Lorenz curve 
() [ ] ;, 0 , 1 LC s s∈ X , can be described by three points: 
 










X  for  12 X X < . (1) 
 
Two neighbouring points are connected by straight lines. The distribution X Lorenz domi-
nates Y, which we abbreviate by  L XY \ , if and only if  ( ) () 11
22 ;; LC LC ≥ XY .  
 
We note that for two individual-populations the Lorenz ordering is complete.
4 
 
In the examples presented we will assume that the underlying preference ordering is repre-
sented by the direct utility function 
 
  () ( )






 +   −
=− +     −   
 (2) 
 
where  2 , ab
γ αα
β ββ
=− =. At first sight the form of the utility function seems to be unusual. 
But it leads to a linear labour supply function  
 
  () , LwM w M α βγ =+ +  (3) 
 
                                                 
4  For  2 n =  every relative inequality measure can be expressed by a strictly increasing transformation of a 













X  for 
12 X X <  where f is strictly increasing.  ( ) I X  is directly related to the Lorenz 
curve of  X since  () () ()
1
2 1; If L C =− XX .  
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which is very well suited for the construction of examples. The ordering is well-defined and 
possesses the properties stated above if  0, 0 α β ≥≤ , and  0 L ≥ . Then the Slutsky matrix is 
symmetric and negative semidefinite (see Stern 1986 for details).  
 
In the following examples we always suppose that  
 
  12 1 2 12 , 0 , a n d 3 wwM M α =< = = = =. (4) 
 
3.  Progressive transfers 
 
Now we consider transfers from the richer to the poorer individual. Let  0 ∆>  denote the 
amount of income redistributed. The amount ∆ has to be small enough such that the ranking 
of incomes is not reversed. 
 
Before the transfer is made income is given by  ( ) ,0 , 1 ,2, iii Xw L w i ==  and  () 12 , X X = X  
where we set  0 i M =  for simplicity. For any exogenous income M we obtain 
() ( ) :, ii i YM w LwM M =+  and define the elasticity of (net) income with respect to exogenous 
income M by 
 














It should be mentioned that in a model having only two commodities  () i YM corresponds to 
expenditure for consumption. Therefore  ( ) ( ) Mi YM ε  can also be interpreted as the income 
elasticity of consumption if the price of consumption is equal to unity. 
 
Supposing that  12 X X <  a progressive transfer of an amount  0 ∆ >  takes place if 
() ( ) 12 YY ∆< − ∆. It yields the income distribution  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 :, YY ∆ =∆ − ∆ Y . Then  ( ) 0 = XY  
and the Lorenz curve of  () ∆ Y  is characterized by 
 











Y . (6) 
 
We are interested in the change of inequality due to a change in ∆ which can be determined 
by the derivative of  () () 12 ; LC ∆ Y  with respect to ∆. Simple calculation and rearrangement 
yields 
 





() () ( ) ()
2 12 1 2
12
12
12 ; dL C Y Y dY dY
YY
dd Y d Y
∆  ∆− ∆ ∆ − ∆− ∆ ∆
=− ∆ + − ∆ 
∆∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ − ∆ 
Y
 
   (7) 
 
for  0 ∆> . The sign of this derivative depends on the magnitude of the elasticities involved. 
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OO  (8) 
 
Thus the income effects are crucial. This result allows us to formulate a sufficient condition 
for Lorenz domination, i.e. for a global inequality decrease: 
 
  () () () () 12 MM MM YM YM εε =∆ =−∆ >   for  ( ) 0, ∆∈∆  , (9) 
 
but, of course, this condition is not necessary.  
 
Now we present an example demonstrating that the effects of a progressive transfer depend 




We employ the linear labour supply function  ( ) , LwM w M α βγ = ++  introduced above and 
set 0 γ = . The parameter β  is varied. Then we get the results collected in Table I: 
 
Table I:  Progressive transfer of ∆. 0 γ =  
() () 11
22 12 1 2
10 37 10 2
33 3 4 7
51 9 3 8 1 9





3 12 0.2 3.3 12.3 0.21
3 12 0.2 3.16 12.6 0.2
1 3 12 0.2 3 13 0.19








Here we have to compare the no-redistribution case  0 ∆ =   ( ) ( ) 0 = XY  with the situation 
after redistribution  () () 1and ∆= ∆ Y . Since the exogenous incomes  i M  are zero by assump-
tion the parameter β  has no influence on the pre-redistribution income, but on the indivi-
duals’ reaction. The income elasticity is given by 
 






εβ =+  (10) 
 
The condition (9) is satisfied for  1 ∆=  and  2
3 β = − . For  5
6 β = −  and  1 −  it is not fulfilled. 
Then inequality is unchanged and increased, respectively. Thus labour supply responses are 
able to reverse a progressive transfer effectively. 
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4.  Redistributional effects of taxation 
 
In this section it is assumed that the government wants to raise some tax revenue by income 
taxation. We are interested in its implications for the income distribution (its redistributional 
effects). At first we examine taxation of income by a proportional tax. Tax liability can be 
described by  () TX t X =  for  0 X ≥  where t denotes the tax rate. Net income is given by 
()( ) 1 X TX tX −= − . 
 
Again we have to consider (gross) income before taxation:  ( ) 12 , X X = X . It corresponds to 
the no-tax situation and has to be compared to post-tax incomes when the individuals have 
adapted to  () TX. Given proportional taxation and the fact that exogenous income is 
assumed to be zero the (new) gross (pre-tax) incomes are equal to  ( )( ) () 1, 0 ii i Zt w L t w =− , 
the (new) net (post-tax) incomes to  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ii Yt tZt =− . 
 
We introduce the tax elasticity of gross income  ( ) i Z t : 
 












 for  0 t > . (11) 
 
Using a well-known rule for elasticities (see e.g. Berck and Sydsaeter (1993)) we obtain 
 
  () () () () () 1 ,0
1





 =−  − 
 (12) 
 
where  () () ,0 w Lw ε  denotes the wage elasticity of labour supply.  
 
Now we investigate the implications for inequality. Defining  ( )( ) ( ) () 12 , tZ t Z t = Z  and 
() () () () 12 , tY t Y t = Y  we get  ( ) () ( ) ( )
11
22 ;; LC t LC t = YZ  since the terms () 1 t −  in the 
nominator and denominator cancel. The (marginal) change in inequality is reflected by 
() ()
1
2; dL C t
dt
Z
. As above it can be derived directly: 
 
  () () () () ( )
()
( )
() () () ()
1
2 2 12 1 2
12
12
; dL C t Zt Zt Zt Zt tt
Z tZ t







for  0 t > . Therefore the sign of the derivative is determined by the magnitude of the respec-
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for  0 t > .  
 
It also allows to formulate a sufficient global condition for an increase or decrease of 




It is again based on the linear supply function. We set  1 β = − . The parameter γ  is varied. 
We get the results shown in Table II: 
 














1 2 10 0.16 2 0.1
0 3 12 0.2 3 0.2
1 4 14 0.2 1 4 0.24
tt








In this case the tax elasticity of post-tax income is given by 
 














For the situations considered in Table II the elasticity is always negative, but its magnitude 
depends on the preference ordering considered. Since  t ε  is proportional to the wage elasticity 
of labour supply, for proportional taxation the income and substitution effect are decisive. 
Obviously inequality can increase, decrease, or be unchanged. The individuals’ working 
decisions are able to yield any result. Proportional taxation is no longer automatically neutral. 
 
A proportional tax schedule can be turned into a progressive or regressive schedule by sub-
tracting or adding a (small) amount ∆: 
 
  () TX t X =+ ∆ . (16) 
 
When  0 ∆< ,  () TX is progressive, when  0 ∆ >  it is regressive. This is even true for very 
small amounts ∆. Therefore Example 2 can be used to argue that progressive taxation can  
  7
increase inequality and regressive taxation can decrease inequality. The argument is simple: 
Starting with the case in which proportional taxation increases inequality we can change the 
tax schedule slightly to become regressive without changing the result (the process is entirely 
continuous!). One can similarly argue for progressive taxation. 
 




Again we suppose that for the linear labour supply function  1 β = − . Then we obtain the 
results shown in Table III. 
 






22 12 1 2
55 1




22 12 1 2
31 9 2
91 6 8 3
() 0 , 0 ,
;;
1 2 10 0.16 2 0.14
() 0 , 0 ,
;;
1 4 14 0.2 1 4 0.23
at t
XXL C Y Y L C
bt t
XXL C Y Y L C
γ
γ
=∆ = = ∆ = −
−= =






5.  Conclusion 
 
When the unrealistic assumption of the exogeneity of labour supply is dropped every out-
come is possible: Progressive transfers and progressive (regressive) taxation may increase or 
decrease inequality or may leave it unchanged. The respective result depends on the income 
or wage elasticities as demonstrated above. The examples presented consider only two indi-
viduals and a simple (linear) labour supply function. It is clear that analogous results can also 
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